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Article for Journal for European Environmental and Planning Law 2017 
 
³%UH[LWDQGWKHUnited Kingdom Water Environment´ 
 




The legal factual background to this discussion of Brexit WKH8.¶VGHSDUWXUHIURPWKH
European Union) may be stated concisely.  On 23 June 2016, a referendum was 
conducted in the UK, under the European Union Referendum Act 2015.  The 
Referendum question was: ³6KRXOGWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRPUHPDLQDPHPEHURIWKH
EuroSHDQ8QLRQRUOHDYHWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ"´  The outcome of the Referendum 
was that about 52% voted to leave the European Union and 48% to remain.  
Following legal proceedings in the UK Supreme Court,1 the Government secured 
authority to initiate withdrawal proceedings under the European Union (Notification of 
Withdrawal) Act 2017.  On 29 March 2017, the UK Government invoked Article 50 of 
the Treaty on European Union, setting the UK on course to leave the EU in March 
2019.  The precise terms of the departure and the future relationship between the 
EU and the UK are presently the subject of negotiations.  Brexit will almost inevitably 
involve repeal of the UK European Communities Act 1972, which serves to 
incorporate EU law into UK national law and to make the UK subject to EU 
institutions.  The effect of this will be that post-Brexit EU legislation (adopted after 
Brexit) will not apply in the UK, but the precise status of existing (pre-Brexit) EU 
legislation in the UK and the form of the continuing relationship between the EU and 
UK remains to be determined.   
 
It can be no understatement to say that the implementation of Brexit in the UK is a 
matter of considerable political controversy and uncertainty.  Widely divergent 
proposals are being proposed and considered, particularly on continuing access to 
the EU single market, the control of movement of persons and the future jurisdiction 
of the Court of Justice of the EU in respect of the UK.  Given this indecision, some 
degree of speculation is unavoidable, but the earlier part of the discussion that 
follows seeks to offer commentary on the most likely legal form of Brexit and the 
implications of this for environmental law and policy.  Taking the EU Water 
                                                          
This paper has been prepared from materials available to the author on 31 August 2017, the date of 
first submission to the Journal of European Environmental and Planning Law.  As a postscript, it 
should be noted that the submission date precedes the second reading of the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill in the UK Parliament, on 11 September 2017, giving effect to provisions in the UK 
Governments Brexit White Paper, discussed below.  For details of the ongoing progress of the Bill, 
see the UK Parliament Website at https://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-
19/europeanunionwithdrawal.html.  This source was accessed on 5 October 2017.  All the other web 
sources referred to in this article were accessed at the same date.   
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 R (on the application of Miller and Dos Santos) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5.  
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Framework Directive2 (WFD) as a focus for consideration, the main aim of the later 
part of the discussion is to assess whether the contribution of EU laws for the 
protection of the water environment in the UK can be maintained or enhanced 
through national laws and administrative measures post-Brexit.  Setting aside the 
momentous social, political and economic implications of Brexit, the much narrower 
question to be addressed here is: can (or to what extent can) EU water protection 
measures be effectively replaced by national laws and administrative measures?   
 
)RUWKHPRVWSDUWWKH³QDWLRQDOODZV´XQGHUGLVFXVVLRQhere are UK-wide laws or 
laws specifically relating to England.  The devolution of environmental powers to 
legislative and executive bodies in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland 3 means 
that there is already some divergence in environmental law between the different 
jurisdictions, though within the overall framework provided by EU environmental law.  
Removal of the need for the devolved administrations to adhere to EU law, following 
Brexit, may have the consequence that increasingly divergent approaches may be 
adopted within the different jurisdictions, depending upon the arrangements that are 
put in place.  Although, the internal UK aspects of Brexit are contentious and 
important from a devolution perspective, the discussion which follows focusses upon 
the UK-wide aspects of Brexit and the environment, and particularly those aspects 
concerned with the water environment.4   
 
Brexit and the Environment: Threat or Opportunity?  
 
The relatively small majority in favour of Brexit in the Referendum seems to be 
generally regarded as decisive.  The main political parties are, at the time of writing, 
of the view that a conclusive democratic mandate exists for Brexit to proceed, though 
the precise form and timetable for this are the source of seemingly intractable 
political debate.  Amongst environmental law commentators (discussed below) there 
seems to be little appetite to challenge the fact of Brexit.  Nonetheless, the view is 
widely shared by commentators that post-Brexit UK environmental law should not 
involve a deterioration of environmental regulatory standards or implementation and 
enforcement mechanisms.  The general focus of discussion seems to be upon 
                                                          
2
 Directive 2000/60/EC Establishing a framework for Community action in the field of water policy.   
3
 Originally, under the Scotland Act 1998, the Government of Wales Act 1998 and the Northern 
Ireland Act 1998, thought these statutes have been extensively amended. 
4
 For further discussion of the devolution aspects of Brexit and the environment, see C. ReiGµ%UH[LW
DQGWKHIXWXUHRI8.HQYLURQPHQWDOODZ¶Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 407; 
Law House of Lords, European Union Committee, Brexit: environment and climate change, 12th 
Report of Session 2016-17 (2017) HL Paper 109, Chapter 9: Devolution and the Environment; R. Lee, 
µ$OZD\V.HHSD+ROGRI1XUVH%ULWLVK(QYLURQPHQWODZDQG([LWIURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶
Journal of Environmental Law 155; UK Government, /HJLVODWLQJIRUWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V:LWKGUDZDO
for the European Union, Cm 9946, March 2017 available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-repeal-bill-white-paper/legislating-for-the-united-
kingdoms-withdrawal-from-the-european-union WKH8.*RYHUQPHQW¶VBrexit White Paper) Chapter 4: 
Interaction with the Devolution Settlements; and 9+H\YDHUWDQG$ýDYRãNL Environmental Law Post 
Brexit, Ch.6 in M. Dougan (ed.) The UK after Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges (2017) and more 
generally J. Hunt, Devolution, Ch.2 in the same collection.   
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seeing Brexit (whatever its inherent merits) as an opportunity for maintaining or 
improving environmental law, as opposed to those who might see it as a means of 
advancing a seriously deregulatory environmental agenda.5  In that vein, the United 
Kingdom Environmental Law Association (UKELA) takes WKHSRVLWLRQWKDW³7KH
development of a post-Brexit framework of environmental legislation presents a 
unique and critically important opportunity for the UK Government and devolved 
administrations to explore ways of improving and strengthening environmental 
UHJXODWLRQ´6   
 
Certainly, Brexit provides almost unlimited opportunities to improve and strengthen 
all aspects of environmental law and policy in the UK, but it might equally be seen as 
a threat to the many achievements secured as a result of EU membership.  It is 
matter of whether the glass is seen as half full or half empty: whether, and how, the 
present Government and future governments will actually use the freedoms gained 
by Brexit to improve and strengthen environmental protection or whether 
environmental protection will be allowed to decline below present or future EU 
standards.7   
 
7KHµJODVVKDOIHPSW\¶SHUVSHFWLYHLVLOOXVWUDWHGE\UHPLQGHUVRIWKHSRRU
environmental performance of the UK prior to joining the EU and before the adoption 
of most of the key environmental directives.8  Hence, a group of leading 
environmentalists warned, prior to the Referendum, of the prospect of a return to 
filthy beaches, foul air and weak conservation laws, recalling the days when the UK 
ZDVGXEEHGZLWKWKHWLWOHRIµthe GLUW\PDQRI(XURSH¶2WKHU commentators have 
drawn attention to the laggard status of the UK Government in respect of 
implementing EU environmental legislation: of the 34 environmental cases brought 
against the UK before the Court of Justice by the European Union, 30 resulted in 
judgments against the UK.9  Topically, the recalcitrance of the UK Government 
towards EU ambient air quality standards is cited as evidence of national 
unwillingness to observe EU environmental standards without the threat of sanctions 
being imposed by the Court of Justice.10  $VLWKDVEHHQSXW³KDYLQJORQJVRXJKWWR
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 See I. Johnston, µ03VSOHGJHWRPDNH8.JUHHQHVWFRXQWU\LQWKHZRUOGDIWHU%UH[LW¶The 
Independent, 8 December 2016; (6FRWIRUGDQG0%RZPDQµ%UH[LWDQG(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZ
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RSSRUWXQLW\IRUWKHHQYLURQPHQW"¶Elaw (the Journal of UKELA) July/August 2017 p.19; and R. Lee, 
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%ULWLVK(QYLURQPHQWDO/DZDQG([LWIURPWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ¶
Journal of Environmental Law 155.   
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 See UKELA website at https://www.ukela.org/UKELAPosition. 
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 V. +H\YDHUWDQG$ýDYRãNLEnvironmental Law Post Brexit, Ch.6 in M. Dougan (ed.) The UK after 
Brexit: Legal and Policy Challenges (2017) 
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 -9LGDOµ%UH[LWZRXOGUHWXUQ%ULWDLQWREHLQJWKHµGLUW\PDQRI(XURSH¶¶The Guardian 3 February 
2016. 
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 House of Lords, European Union Committee, 12th Report of Session 2016-17, Brexit: environment 
and climate change, 2017 (HL Paper 109) para.69   
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 (6FRWIRUGµAir Quality law in the United Kingdom at a Crossroads¶ OUPBlog, 3 October 2016 and 
House of Lords, European Committee, 12th Report of Session 2016-17, Brexit: environment and 
climate change, 2017 (HL Paper 109) 2017 paras.29 and 68 to 71, quoting observations by Alan 
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dilute [EU] air quality laws and being embarrassed by their breach, can one really 
VXSSRVHWKDW8.JRYHUQPHQWVZLOOEHPLQGHGWRUHWDLQWKHP"´11   
 
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHµJODVVKDOIIXOO¶SHUVSHctive is buttressed by the seemingly firm 
commitment of the present Government to environmental improvement.  The 
&RQVHUYDWLYHV¶PDQLIHVWRincorporated the pledge WRHQVXUH³ZHEHFRPHWKHILUVW
generation to leave the environment in a better state than we IRXQGLW´ and this has 
been reaffirmed in relation to the environmental aspects of Brexit.12  Some certainty 
as to future environmental protection is offered by the prospect of a 25 Year Plan for 
WKH(QJOLVKHQYLURQPHQW7KLVZLOOµKHOSensure the environment is appropriately 
maintained and improved so it flourishes and continues to underpin our economic 
success and wellbeing¶DQGRIIHUVDUDQJHRIlong-term commitments to support this 
(though it should be noted that the timetable for the publication of the plan has 
slipped somewhat).13  In addition, the supposed laggard reputation of the UK in 
respect of the environment might be seen as contradicted by measures which show 
environmental leadership on the part of the UK, with a particular example of this in 
the Climate Change Act 2008.  Certainly, the House of Commons Environment Audit 
Committee has taken the view that the UK is widely regarded as one of the most 
LQIOXHQWLDOPHPEHUVWDWHVLQVKDSLQJWKH(8¶VHQYLURQPHQWDOSROLFLHV14   
 
Clearly, Brexit might be used as an opportunity for enhancement of environmental 
law if the ostensible green-mindedness of the present Government, and future 
governments, translates into appropriate actions, but whether this will prove to be the 
case is unknowable.  The best that can be done is to look at the initial indications of 
what Brexit may hold for environmental and water protection.   
 
The White Paper on Withdrawal from the EU 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Andrews of ClientEarth, an organisation that has brought important legal proceedings to expose the 
legal failings the UK Government, see R (ClientEarth) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Food 
and Rural Affairs [2015] UKSC28.   
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 &3XWKXSSDOO\µ%UH[LW± WKUHDWRURSSRUWXQLW\IRUWKHHQYLURQPHQW"¶Elaw (the Journal of UKELA) 
July/August 2017 p.20.   
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 I. Johnston, ;Environmentalists YRLFHFRQFHUQVRYHU7KHUHVD0D\¶V*UHDW5HSHDO%LOO¶, The 
Independent, 30 March 2017; The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2017, Forward 
Together ± Our Plan for a Stronger Britain and a Prosperous Future, at 
https://www.conservatives.com/manifesto; and UK Government, /HJLVODWLQJIRUWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V




 See Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Single Departmental Plan: 2015 to 2020, 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/defra-single-departmental-plan-2015-to-2020/single-
departmental-plan-2015-to-2020.   
14
 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, Third Report of Session 2015-16, EU and UK 
Environmental Policy (2016) HC537, 23 March 2016 para.18 available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmenvaud/537/537.pdf, and see written 
evidence to the Committee by R. Andreas Kraemer, arguing that the UK has had a strong role in 
shaping European environmental policy and offers several examples to illustrate thisLQFOXGLQJ³WKH
2000 Water Framework Directive, which built mainly on UK (and French) practices of managing water 




At the time of writing the most authoritative statement of the UK *RYHUQPHQW¶Vaims 
for implementing Brexit are to be found in the Brexit White Paper, Legislating for the 
UnLWHG.LQJGRP¶VZLWKGUDZDOIURPthe European Union.15  This envisages the 
enactment of a µGreat Repeal Bill¶ VXEVHTXHQWO\WHUPHGWKHµ(XURSHDQ8QLRQ
:LWKGUDZDO%LOO¶which will seek to secure an orderly transition by converting the 
acquis of EU law into UK national law and the repeal of the European Communities 
Act 1972.  The intention is that this translation will involve essentially the same rules 
and laws being retained, but with EU provisions replaced by corresponding national 
laws.  However, it is recognised that a significant amount of µEU-derived law¶ will 
cease to have its intended effect after departure, where, for example, the 
involvement of an EU institution, regime or system is anticipated.  In summary, the 
purpose of the Great Repeal Bill is to do three things: 1/ to repeal the European 
Communities Act 1972; 2/ to convert all EU law, at the point of exit, into UK law; and 
3/ to create powers to make secondary legislation to facilitate corrections to laws that 
would no longer operate appropriately and to allow national law to reflect the content 
of any withdrawal agreement under Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union.   
 
The effect of the Great Repeal Bill will be that the treaties that serve as the primary 
sources of EU law will become inapplicable in the UK after it departs from the EU, 
but may continue to be used in the interpretation of EU-derived law that is preserved 
in the form of UK law.  Leaving the EU will also mark the end of the jurisdiction of the 
Court of Justice of the EU in the UK,16 though reference may be made to the case 
law of the Court at the time of Brexit in interpreting EU-derived law and pre-Brexit EU 
case law will be given the same binding status as decisions of the Supreme Court.  
Nonetheless, following Brexit, the Supreme Court would have the power to depart 
from past decisions of the (8&RXUWµZKHUHLWDSSHDUVULJKWWRGRVR¶.17   
 
The White Paper provides a pertinent discussion of how these mechanisms will 
operate in relation to environmental law.  In respect of this, the current legislative 
framework for the environment, including EU measures, is recognised to have 
delivered tangible benefits.  Accordingly, the Great Repeal Bill will ensure that the 
whole body of existing EU environmental law continues to have effect in UK law.  It is 
envisaged that this will provide businesses and stakeholders with maximum certainty 
as the UK leaves the EU.  However, over time the possibility of change in 
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 UK Government, /HJLVODWLQJIRUWKH8QLWHG.LQJGRP¶V:LWKGUDZDOIRUWKH(XURpean Union, Cm 
9946, March 2017 available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-repeal-bill-white-
paper/legislating-for-the-united-kingdoms-withdrawal-from-the-european-union.  
16
 For a subsequent UK Government statement on the role of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union see Enforcement and Dispute Resolution: a future partnership paper (UK Government 




 House of Lords, Practice Direction of 1966 ([1966] 3 All ER 77) to the effect that precedent would 
be departed from in order to achieve justice, adopted by Supreme Court 2010 see UKSC Practice 
Direction 3 available at https://www.supremecourt.uk/docs/practice-direction-03.pdf. 
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environmental legislation is envisaged to ensure delivery of the GovernmenW¶V
commitment to improve the environment within a generation.  Thus, the longer term 
status of EU environmental law in the UK is left, perhaps purposefully, uncertain.   
 
Environmental Concerns about Brexit 
 
The commitment to retaining EU environmental legislation post-Brexit was 
foreshadowed by a general consensus of approval and support for environmental 
measures adopted at EU level.  However, the broad endorsement of EU 
environmental law seemed less influential in the minds of those casting their votes in 
the Referendum than issues like sovereignty, control of immigration and economic 
impactsRUFRPELQDWLRQVRIWKHVHIDFWRUVFDSWXUHGLQWKH%UH[LWFDPSDLJQ¶VVORJDQ
µWDNHEDFNFRQWURO¶.18  Nonetheless, for the purpose of informing the debate on the 
referendum on membership of the EU, the House of Commons Environmental Audit 
Committee undertook an inquiry on the EU and UK Environmental Policy.¶19  This 
inquiry confirmed a generally positive view of EU membership insofar as 
environmental policy was concerned.  The general view of witnesses who gave 
evidence before the Committee was that EU membership had been beneficial for the 
UK environment.  The Inquiry provided a forum for the airing of diverse concerns, 
relating to the need for more rigorous national implementation of EU measures and 
the need for more efficient regulation in terms of reducing burdensome costs upon 
business.20  However, the overwhelming majority of those giving evidence took the 
view that membership of the EU had improved environmental protection in the UK.   
 
The Environmental Audit &RPPLWWHH¶V5HSRUWQRWHd however, the lack of any plans 
for environmental law and policy in the event of a vote to leave the EU and difficulties 
that this would present on various fronts.   
³Despite the key role that the EU has played in UK environmental policy, relatively 
little appears to have been done by way of planning in the case of the UK leaving . . . 
. There are, therefore, significant unanswered questions about what relationship a 
UK outside the EU would have with it and with the rest of the world, just as there are 
unanswered questions as to how our relationship with the EU might develop.  
Nonetheless, two points were made to us repeatedly. Firstly, the UK would still need 
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 See the Daily Express coverage at http://www.express.co.uk/news/politics/681706/Boris-Johnson-




 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, Third Report of Session 2015-16, EU and UK 
Environmental Policy (2016) HC537, 23 March 2016 available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201516/cmselect/cmenvaud/537/537.pdfand see the 
Government Response HC 644, 7 September 2016 available at 
https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmenvaud/644/644.pdf.   
20
 Although a dissenting Report by one member of the (15-member) Committee, Peter Lilley, should 
be noted.  He maintained WKDWWKH&RPPLWWHH¶VFRQFOXVLRQVZHUHPXWXDOO\FRQWUDGLctory, not based on 
adequate research and ignored some of the evidence, but these views were rejected by other 
members of the Committee, Ibid. Environmental Audit Committee p.31.   
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to meet international environmental commitments made in the UN and elsewhere, 
PDQ\RIZKLFKDUHUHÀHFWHGLQ(8ODZ Secondly, a UK outside the EU would still 
have to comply with some aspects of EU environmental legislation, particularly if it 
wishes to secure preferential access to the Single Market, but with significantly less 
ability to LQÀXHQFHWKHSURFHVVRILWVGHYHORSPHQW³21  
 
These observations proved remarkably prescient.  At the time of writing, the precise 
terms of controversial post-Brexit UK-EU trade relations lie some way over the 
horizon, but there are many examples of EU environmental legislation giving effect to 
obligations under international conventions to which the UK is a party.  Although the 
UK may be leaving the EU, it remains subject to important international 
environmental obligations arising outside EU law which will be unaffected by Brexit.22   
 
By way of illustration, the EU Water Framework Directive may be seen to be giving 
effect to various international obligations.  First, the Directive may be seen as giving 
effect to the OSPAR Convention23 and its Hazardous Substances Strategy24 insofar 
as its aim is to achieve the elimination of priority hazardous substances and 
contribute to achieving concentrations in the marine environment near background 
values for naturally occurring substances.25  A second example of overlapping 
international and EU obligations from the WFD is its treatment of public access to 
LQIRUPDWLRQDQGFRQVXOWDWLRQDQG³HQFRXUDJLQJWKHDFWLve involvement of all 
LQWHUHVWHGSDUWLHVLQWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIWKLV'LUHFWLYH´ZLWKUHJDUGWRDOODVSHFWVRI
river basin management planning.26  This is an EU water management application of 
the procedural environmental obligations that arise under the Aarhus Convention,27 
to which both the EU and UK are a party.28  A third example arises where the WFD 
may serve to formalise customary international law obligations between member 
states of the EU by ensuring the internationally coordinated management of 
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 Ibid para.64. 
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 5&KXUFKLOOµ&RQWLQXLQJREOLJDWLRQV,QWHUQDWLRQDODQG7UDGH&RQVWUDLQWVRQ5HJXODWRU\&KRLFHV¶$
paper delivered as part of the UKELA Brexit Seminar, Bristol, 18 November 2015, slides available at 
https://www.ukela.org/content/page/5580/4%20Churchill%20.pdf; &5HLGµ%UH[LWDQGWKHIXWXUHRI8.
HQYLURQPHQWDOODZ¶Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 407 DQG50DFURU\µ%UH[LW
XQOLNHO\WRJLYH8.IUHHUHLQRYHUJUHHQODZV¶ENDS Report 499 September 2016 p.22. 
23
 The 1992 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic, see 
OSPAR Commission website at https://www.ospar.org/convention/text and see WFD Recital 21. 
24
 https://www.ospar.org/site/assets/files/1428/hazsub_strategy.pdf.   
25
 WFD Recitals 22 and 27 and Art.16. 
26
 WFD Recital 46 and Art.14.   
27
 The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Convention on Access to Information, 
Public Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental matters, done at 
Aarhus, Denmark, on 25 June 1998 at 
https://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/pp/documents/cep43e.pdf and see EU webpages on the 
Aarhus Convention: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/.   
28
 No amendment was made to the WFD to give effect to Aarhus obligations because it was thought 
that this Directive was already compliant with the Aarhus obligations in respect of public participation 
in decision making.  See para.3.5 European Commission, COM 2000 839 final,Proposal for a 
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council providing for public participation in respect of 
the drawing up of certain plans and programmes relating to the environment and amending Council 
Directives 85/337/EEC and 96/61/EC. 
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transboundary waters.29  In the event of difficulties in reaching agreement on 
coordinated measures between different member states sharing an international 
river basin, the Directive provides for referral of issues which cannot be resolved to 
the Commission and for the Commission to make recommendations to the member 
states concerned.30  Insofar as this applies to river basins shared by the UK and the 
Republic of Ireland31 it is unlikely that the Commission would have a role to play in 
resolving disputes following Brexit, but there would still, arguably, be customary 
international obligations to cooperate on measures to avoid environmental harm to a 
neighbouring country irrespective of the future repeal of any duties set out in the 
Directive.   
 
Beyond these three instances, there may be many other examples of EU 
environmental law mirroring international obligations that will remain important 
following Brexit.  The issues identified by the Environmental Audit Committee remain 
relevant and the decline of EU environmental law, so far as the UK is concerned, 
may well be matched by an increase in the significance of other kinds of international 
environmental law.32   
 
Post-Brexit UK Environmental Legislation and Governance 
 
The fact that environment protection did not seem to feature as a prominent issue in 
determining the outcome of the Referendum33 may account for the lack of planning 
for post-Brexit environmental measures noted by the Environmental Audit 
Committee.  Nonetheless, the impending reality of Brexit means that environmental 
law and policy outside the EU must now be provided for.  As has been noted, the 
most authoritative indication of how this is to be done is provided in the 
*RYHUQPHQW¶V:KLWH3DSHURQZithdrawal from the EU.  In the view of the 
Government, continuity in environmental protection will be achieved by repatriation 
of legislation, without changing its substantive regulatory content, in the short term at 
least.  Whether this vision can be achieved or not is a matter of debate.  The 
essence of this debate is the question as to what EU law has contributed to 
environmental law in the UK and whether this contribution is capable of being 
replicated in national law.   
 
The Environment Minister, Andrea Leadsom, giving evidence before a Parliamentary 
committee,34 took the view that about two-thirds of EU environmental legislation can 
                                                          
29
 WFD Recital 35 and Art3(3).   
30
 WFD Art12.   
31
 See the Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2017 
2017/81, particularly Regs. 3 and 4.  AUHDVQDPHGDV³1HDJK%DQQ´³1RUWK:HVWHUQ´DQG³6KDQQRQ´
are identified as international river basin districts.   
32
 See n.22 above on sources relating to relevant international law provisions.  
33
 ')UHQFKµ$OWHUQDWH5HDOLWLHV%UH[LWDQG3RNpPRQ¶, OUP Blog 10 October 2016. 
34
 House of Commons, Environmental Audit Committee, The Future of the Natural Environment after 
the EU Referendum, Sixth Report of Session 2016-17, HC599 2017, particularly evidence given on 25 
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be brought into UK law with mere technical changes, but this will not be possible for 
the remainder.  This means that continuing work is needed to ensure that those 
measures that are difficult to transpose into national law continue to function 
effectively after leaving the EU.  However, the Minister was rather unspecific on the 
reasons why the problematic third of EU environmental legislation was difficult to 
transpose.  Nevertheless, the general view of the Government seems to be that 
transposition is a matter of lesser or greater WHFKQLFDOµGLIILFXOW\¶UDWKHUWKDQ
something which raises insuperable issues of legal principle.   
 
Some useful insights into the challenges in transposing EU law are offered by Lee 
and Fisher,35 who draw attention to the combination of substantive and procedural 
considerations that arise in securing satisfactory levels of environmental and 
ecological protection.  The point is well made by these authors that much of what is 
commonly, but broadly, termed µHQYLURQPHQWDOODZ¶LVactually aERXWµHQYLURQPHQWDO
JRYHUQDQFH¶7KHOHJDOUXOHV that set obligations for environmental and ecological 
quality standards and measures actually presuppose an µHQYLURQPHQWDO
LQIUDVWUXFWXUH¶RIUHVSRQVLEOHSXEOLFERGLHVZLWKDUDQJHRISRZHUVDQGGXWLHVZKLFK
provide the context in which the substantive rules operate.  That is, the functioning of 
environmental laws requires or presupposes the existence of public institutions that 
have appropriate responsibilities for directing, regulating, authorising, guarding and 
being subject to duties in respect of securing environmental protection.  Not least 
significant amongst the diverse bundle of environmental governance obligations is 
the range of measures that may be applied to call public bodies to account for 
shortcomings in the performance of their environmental protection roles.36   
 
When the significance of environmental governance is appreciated, it is apparent 
that in leaving the EU it is not just about the substantive environmental laws that 
need to be translated into national legislation.  It is also about the national replication 
of environmental infrastructure that accompanies EU environmental measures and, 
not least important, the range of mechanisms for securing institutional accountability.  
As Lee and Fisher put it,  
³(8ODZLPSRVHVREOLJDWLRQVRQ0HPEHU6WDWHVWRSODQSXEOLFO\IRULPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
WRUHSRUWSXEOLFO\DQGWRWKH&RPPLVVLRQDQGRWKHU0HPEHU6WDWHVRQKRZWKH\¶UH
doing, to explain failures to comply, or the lawful use of derogations and exceptions, 
and to explain how compliance will be achieved in the future´ 
Beyond that, EU law relies upon the capacity of private parties to scrutinise and 
challenge governments, the powers of domestic courts to ensure implementation of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
October 2016, http://parliamentlive.tv/Event/Index/6d126351-67a1-4c19-a757-14b5215776d4 and 
http://data.parliament.uk/writtenevidence/committeeevidence.svc/evidencedocument/environmental-
audit-committee/the-future-of-the-natural-environment-after-the-eu-referendum/oral/42022.html.   
35
 M. Lee and L. Fisher, µEnvironmental Governance after the EU: the Need for Accountability: An 
Expert Review¶ OUPblog 28 November 2016,   
36
 See also M. Lee, µBrexit: Environmental Accountability and EU Governance¶, OUPBlog 17 October 
2016 DQG0/HHµ$FFRXQWDELOLW\IRU(QYLURQPHQWDO6WDQGDUGVDIWHU%UH[LW¶, 2017 Environmental Law 
Review 89.   
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law, the overseeing UROHRIWKH&RPPLVVLRQDVWKHµZDWFKGRJ¶RIWKHWUHDWLHVDQGWKH
role of the Court of Justice to determine violations and to imposes sanctions in 
certain cases.   
 
Against this environmental governance background, Lee and Fisher identify three 
matters that must be provided for if there is to be no diminution in environmental 
governance as a result of Brexit.  First, in respect of planning and reporting 
obligations, responsible governmental bodies should explain how specified levels of 
environmental quality are to be secured, to report on progress in securing these, and 
be subject to public scrutiny and legal challenge where these obligations are not 
discharged transparently.  Second, in respect of adjudication, there is a need for 
appropriately empowered courts to ensure that relevant public bodies properly meet 
their environmental obligations and stay within their legal responsibilities.  Third, the 
important overseeing role of the European Commission, in ensuring that Member 
States fulfil their EU environmental obligations, needs to be met by a suitable 
replacement body, perhaps an enhanced ombudsman of some kind, with 
comparable powers to call the UK Government to account.  As the authors put it, in 
µWDNLQJEDFNFRQWURO¶³ZHIRUJHW in the infrastructure of environmental accountability at 
RXUSHULO´ 
 
The realisation that the most challenging aspects of Brexit are actually about 
institutional responsibilities and safeguards rather than about transposition of 
substantive rules of environmental law is also taken as key focus of the UKELA 
Report, Brexit and Environmental Law: Enforcement and Political Accountability 
Issues.37  This is concerned with the post-Brexit environmental duties of government 
and public bodies, particularly how these might change to encompass the 
supervisory, reporting and enforcement roles of the European Commission and the 
adjudicative and sanctioning roles of the Court of Justice of the European Union.   
 
A particular difficulty is seen to arise in securing accountability of government and 
public bodies DQGLQSURYLGLQJDQDWLRQDOFRXQWHUSDUWRIWKHFLWL]HQ¶VFRPSODLQWV
procedure that arises under EU law.  To some extent, the national enforcement of 
public duties with regard to the environment can be secured by judicial review 
proceedings, but the limitations of this are manifold.  Not least, this is because 
judicial review is concerned with the legality and/or procedure of decision making by 
public bodies.  It is not generally available to challenge the merits of a decision: 
which is exactly what is sought in many instances.  Beyond that, judicial review 
proceedings usually need to be instigated by environmentally concerned individuals 
or environmental campaigning bodies, potentially at considerable expense.38   
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 UKELA July 2017, available at https://www.ukela.org/content/doclib/317.pdf. 
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Beyond the obstacles to legal proceedings to challenge the Government and public 
bodies for their environmental failings, is the question of what national law remedy 
could be given where there has been found to be a breach of legal requirements.  
There is no national counterpart of the power the Court of Justice of the EU to 
impose financial sanctions on governments for violations of public duties.39  The 
point may fairly be made that the sanctioning power of the Court has been sparingly 
used in environmental contexts, with only 11 environmental cases up until 2015.  
Nonetheless, the deterrent effect of the prospect of financial penalties must be 
considerable in environmental, as in other, contexts.  As the UKELA Report notes, 
the sanctioning power of the Court of Justice will cease to apply on Brexit and it is 
difficult to see what national provisions could be put in place to serve as a 
counterpart.   
 
The particular concerns about the loss of supervisory control over implementation of 
EU environmental law after Brexit arise because of the peculiar role of environmental 
law as contrasted with other fields of law that will be repatriated.  In many areas of 
EU law there are bodies with vested commercial interests in ensuring compliance, 
such as competition law, for example, where economic competitors will be vigilant to 
raise objections to infringements that are seen as involving unfair competition.  By 
contrast, environmental law is characterised as µvulnerable¶ because of the largely 
µunowned¶ status of the environment and because environmental harms are so 
diffusely spread that individuals rarely have a good commercial reason to pursue 
enforcement proceedings.  In the UKELA Report this vulnerability of the environment 
is seen as a reason why a specialised national body should be established to 
oversee the implementation of environmental law and to replace the supervisory role 
RIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQDVWKHµJXDUGLDQRIWKHWUHDWLHV¶+RZHYHUZKDWOHJDO
form the post-Brexit environmental supervisory body should take is not apparent and 
the Report offers a useful survey of various ombudsman and parliamentary 
commissioner roles, and specialised environmental courts, from different jurisdictions 
that might serve as models for the UK and/or devolved administrations to adopt in 
post-Brexit environmental contexts.   
 
EU Water Legislation after Brexit 
 
Most of the published commentary of the legal aspects of Brexit has been pitched at 
a fairly high level of generality, offering observations only in respect of EU 
environmental law as a whole, without detailed consideration of the impacts in 
particular spheres of environmental regulation.  Recognising the uncertainties, the 
following discussion offers some more specific observations on what Brexit might 
mean for EU water legislation or at least a centrally important measure in this field: 
the EU Water Framework Directive.  This Directive is commonly seen as a key EU 
measure in relation to the water environment because it sets out broad strategic 
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objectives for the chemical, physical and ecological state of diverse waters within its 
scope, particularly the need to meet the requirement RIµJRRGVWDWXV¶.  Alongside the 
statement of strategic environmental objectives, the Directive sets out a range of 
activities for the assessment and purposive management of waters to achieve good 
status.  These activities involve formulating programmes of measures, set out in river 
basin management plans, established at a national level or internationally.  The 
breadth of the WFD, both in terms of the range of assessment, planning and 
operational activities that must be undertaken and duration of implementation 
obligations, some of which require actions extending into the indefinite future, make 
WKLVGLUHFWLYHDJRRGµFDVHVWXG\¶WRLOOXVWUDWHSDUWLFXODUDVSHFWVRI%UH[LWLQDVSHFLILF
environmental context.   
 
In relation to the WFD, the general approach VHWRXWLQWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶V:KLWH
Paper would mean the preservation of national implementing legislation, subject to 
any corrections of this needed to recognise Brexit.  Separate implementing 
legislation is in place to implement the Directive in different jurisdictions within the 
UK, but in respect of England and Wales the key provisions are the WFD 
µImplementing Regulations¶.40  Broadly, these Regulations establish a division of 
responsibility between the operational functions, allocated to the Environment 
Agency in England, and the executive role of the Government ministers acting as the 
µDSSURSULDWHDXWKRULW\¶+HQFHLWLVIRUWKHDSSURSULDWHDXWKRULW\formally to approve 
draft river basin management plans, to give guidance and, where necessary, 
directions for the purpose of implementing the Directive.  It is for the Agency to 
undertake operational activities such as the analysis of the characteristics of river 
basin districts, reviewing impacts on water, monitoring and formulating 
environmental objectives and programmes of measures, preparing, reviewing and 
amending river basin plans.  These exercises must be undertaken subject to 
deadlines and procedural requirements concerning public consultation and other 
matters.   
 
In many respects, the WFD Implementing Regulations restate, as national law 
requirements upon the Environment Agency and the Secretary of State, obligations 
that arise under the WFD.  So, for example, the duties of the Agency in respect of 
river basin characterisation, economic analysis, identifying protected areas and 
monitoring are formulated in a way that directly corresponds with provisions under 
the Directive and need to be accomplished by deadlines corresponding to those in 
                                                          
40
 Originally, the Directive was implemented in England and Wales by the Water Environment (Water 
Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2003 (SI 2003/3242) but these regulations 
were amended to accommodate amendments to the Directive and have now been replaced by the 
Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2017 (SI 
2017/407).  Regulation 38 of the 2017 Regulations contains a transitional provision ensuring that 
things done under the 2003 Regulations (for example, the various analyses and assessments, and 
the programmes of measures required under the Directive) continue to have effect as if done under 
the 2017 Regulations.  Separate Regulations provide for the implementation of the WFD in other 
jurisdictions within the UK.   
13 
 
the Directive.  In respect of environmental objectives, programmes of measures and 
draft river basin management plans the duties of the Agency again correspond to 
requirements of the Directive.  In many respects these REOLJDWLRQVDUHµKLVWRULF¶LQWKH
sense that the activities have already been accomplished by the deadlines required 
by the Directive.  In other instances the Directive obligations are of a continuing kind, 
in requiring things to done at future dates, which lie beyond Brexit.  Specifically, the 
duties in respect of environmental objectives, programmes of measures and 
formulating draft river basin management plans, require the appropriate authority to 
ensure that these are periodically reviewed at six year intervals after 22 December 
2015.41   
 
The status of continuing provisions of this kind raises significant questions about the 
8.¶V post-Brexit commitment to the Directive: is the UK committing itself solely to the 
obligations under the Directive as they exist at the point of Brexit or does the UK 
intend to remain bound to the ongoing commitments to environmental improvement 
under the Directive, even where these may require substantially new measures to be 
taken after Brexit and involve obligations that may extend into the indefinite future?  
 
Similar kinds of question may be raised about the general duties that are provided 
for under the national Implementing Regulations.  These require the Secretary of 
State and the Environment Agency to exercise their relevant functions so as to 
secure compliance with the Directive, particularly in relation to the achievement of 
the environmental objectives of the Directive through programmes of measures 
coordinated for river basin districts.42  This means that powers and duties under the 
Regulations and other statutory and secondary legislation must be used purposively, 
with the need to secure compliance with the Directive as an objective.  Up until the 
time of Brexit, the meaning of this is reasonably clear, but post-Brexit various 
interpretations seem possible.  First, do the obligations to secure compliance with 
the Directive mean ³WKH'LUHFWLYH´ as it was at the point of Brexit, as opposed to 
modifications which might take place after this?  Second, does the reference WR³WKH
'LUHFWLYH´LQFOXGHnon-legally binding guidance on its implementation and, if so, does 
this encompass only guidance issued before Brexit or also guidance issued 
afterwards?  
 
The question about accommodating post-Brexit modifications to the WFD in UK law 
is more than a purely hypothetical concern.  The WFD has actually been modified a 
number of times since its adoption.43  The prospect of further amendments arises as 
a consequence of European Commission's Regulatory Fitness and Performance 
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Programme (REFIT) which seeks to simplify or withdraw EU laws, to ease the 
burden on businesses and facilitate implementation.  Amendments may well follow if 
screening of the effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and added value of 
the Directive shows that it is not delivering as expected.44  Beyond the prospect of 
amendments of the Directive to reduce µred tape¶, is the certainty that it will be 
reviewed by the Commission within 19 years of its entry into force and that the 
Commission will propose any necessary amendments.45  The upshot of these factors 
LVWKDWWKH:)'PLJKWEHVWEHVHHQDVDIDLUO\µG\QDPLF¶SLHFHRIOHJLVODWLRQZKLFK
has been modified, and will probably continue to be modified, over time.  If the UK 
Government is proposing to commit itself to ³the Directive´ as it stands at the point of 
Brexit, there is the prospect that this will quite soon be superseded by changes at EU 
level and the UK will become insulated from those changes, so that the UK¶VKLVWRULF 
time-of-Brexit version of ³the Directive´ and the evolving EU version will become 
increasingly different over time.   
 
On the question of whether ³the Directive´ should continue to be interpreted in the 
light of guidance, the answer seems to be inevitably in the affirmative, given the 
technical complexity of many water management issues and the need for a 
consistent understanding of how Directive obligations should be interpreted and 
applied in practice.  However, the issues of continuity of substantive legal provisions 
are paralleled by questions about the status of guidance following Brexit.   
 
Insofar as nationally promulgated guidance is concerned,46 this is not likely to be 
immediately problematic: there is no reason why the national guidance should not 
continue to operate after Brexit.  However, it should be appreciated that the 
implementation of the WFD is peculiar in respect of the role of EU-level guidance on 
its practical interpretation and application.47  For the purpose of providing this 
guidance, a Common Implementation Strategy48 (CIS) was established at EU level, 
involving working groups of experts and stakeholders from member states producing 
                                                          
44
 European Commission - Press release, Official launch of REFIT Platform: New approach brings 
together stakeholders for better regulation and better results, 29 January 2016, at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-188_en.htm; COM(2015) 215 final, European 
Commission, Better regulation for better results - An EU agenda, http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/better_regulation/documents/com_2015_215_en.pdf; and see European Commission web 
pages, Refit ± making EU law simpler and less costly, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-making-
process/overview-law-making-process/evaluating-and-improving-existing-laws/reducing-burdens-and-
simplifying-law/refit-making-eu-law-simpler-and-less-costly_en.   
45
 WFD Art.19(2). 
46
 For England and Wales see, Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs and Welsh 




 See WFD Recital 49, concerning the adoption of guidelines by the Commission to promote a 
thorough understanding and consistent application of the criteria for characterisation of the river basin 
districts and evaluation of water status. 
48




a series of documents on key aspects of implementation of the Directive.49  Although 
the CIS guidance documents are expressly stated not to be legally binding, it is 
difficult fully to understand the practical implications of many Directive obligations 
without making reference to these documents.   
 
The critical question, therefore, is whether the rolling over of the substantive 
requirements of the WFD into national law will also encompass the existing EU CIS 
guidance.  Beyond this is the issue of whether the continuing status of EU guidance 
in the UK will also encompass CIS documents issued after Brexit.  If so, it would be 
reasonable for UK bodies to have an input into the preparations future guidance 
documents, but, paradoxically, this is just the sort of UK engagement with EU 
institutions and bodies that Brexit might seek to curtail.  Clearly, there are some 
momentous issues remaining to be resolved as regards the functioning of non-legal 
materials relating to the operation of ³the Directive´.   
 
Reporting Obligations under the WFD 
 
Another problematic aspect of seeking to insure post-Brexit legislative continuity by 
the rolling over of national legislation implementing EU directives is the doubtful 
supposition that EU directives and national implementing legislation are co-
extensive.  On this, it may EHUHFDOOHGWKDW(8GLUHFWLYHVDUHVWDWHGWREH³DGGUHVVHG
WR0HPEHU6WDWHV´50 meaning that the ultimate responsibility for compliance falls 
upon the particular member state and not upon nation bodies such as competent 
authorities.  A consequence of this is that there can be requirements of a Directive 
that do not need to be transposed into national law as this would be superfluous 
because they are directly binding upon the Government of the member state and do 
not need to be imposed upon competent or other public bodies.51  The existence of 
WKHVHµXQ-WUDQVSRVHG¶REOLJDWLRQVXQGHUWKH:)'UDLVHVparticular problems for post-
Brexit continuity.   
 
A good example of an un-transposed obligation arises in respect of reporting 
obligations under the WFD.  The European Commission is required to publish 
reports on the implementation of the Directive 12 years after its entry into force and 
every six years thereafter, reviewing progress on implementation, the status of 
waters, a survey of river basin management plans and other matters.  For this 
purpose, a summary of information provided by member states is to be included in 
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the &RPPLVVLRQ¶Vreports.52  In order to enable the Commission to do this, an 
obligation is imposed upon member states to send copies of river basin management 
plans and updates of these to the Commission along with other information relating 
to water analyses and monitoring, and implementation of programmes of measures 
that need to be undertaken under the Directive.53   
 
The general position with regard to obligations of the UK to send information to EU 
institutions post-Brexit is considered, in outline at least, under the UK GovernmHQW¶V
Brexit White Paper.54  In respect of reporting of the kind envisaged under the WFD, it 
is suggested that there should be no legal barrier to continuing to do so.  However, 
where the UK had not explicitly agreed to continue to provide information, in Brexit 
negotiations, it is suggested that there may well be reasons why the UK would no 
longer wish to send information and there may be situations where it would make 
sense to amend legislation to avoid previously reciprocal arrangements becoming 
one-sided.  How this might apply to reporting arrangements under the Directive is far 
from clear, but the serious possibility remains that the UK might decide to cease 
providing water information post Brexit.  Given this possibility, the observations of 
UKELA on the need to implement a transparent national system for formally 
reporting and monitoring environmental information, noted above, seem particularly 




The discussion must conclude by revisiting the introductory question on Brexit: to 
what extent can EU water protection law be replicated in UK national law?  On this, it 
has been seen that different aspects of EU pose different challenges, but the UK 
*RYHUQPHQW¶VSUHVHQWLQWHQWLRQWRWUDQVODWH(8REOLJDWLRns into national law, may 
still fail to capture some key elements of EU environmental and water law.  Certainly 
there are many practical aspects of this regulatory translation that are technically 
challenging and will demand major innovations in the national approach to 
environmental protection.  Beyond that, commentators have drawn attention to the 
environmental governance infrastructure that will be lost on Brexit, including the 
need for careful consideration of national measures to ensure government 
accountability post Brexit.   
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Further beyond the need for appropriate environmental laws and governance 
infrastructure is the more nebulous, but no less important, aspect of the supra-
national ethos in which environmental and ecological problems are characterised 
and addressed by law and other mechanisms.  The often-repeated saying is that 
µenvironmental pollution does not respect national boundaries¶.  This has as its 
counterpart the need for transboundary cooperation between polluters and recipients 
of pollution or environmental degradation of any kind.  Developing a regional 
international consensus about environmental problems and common regulatory 
solutions to these might be seen as the greatest achievement of the EU in respect of 
the environment.  The UK Government is about to replace this culture of consensus-
building and mutuality between nations by a culture of national isolation in which the 
UK ZLOOµJRLWDORQH¶LQredefining environmental problems and regulatory responses 
independently from its neighbours and without the possibility supra-national scrutiny.  
If it is true that environmental law is inherently multi-level, polycentric and 
transnationally coordinated, then the UK seems set to spectacularly unlearn the 
lessons of the last thirty years.56   
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